In an environment with multiple autonomous agents, the performance of an action may have effects on the beliefs and goals of the witnessing agents in addition to the direct effects. The awareness of such mental effects is critical for the success of a plan in multi-agent environments. This paper provides a formulation of social plans, and show that social planning can be done by including models of other agents' minds in the planning domain. A social planning agent is constructed based on automatic generation of PDDL (Planning Domain Description Language) domains from knowledge about other agents.
Introduction
Automated planning is an important research topic for designing agents that achieve their goals by modifying the environment through a sequence of actions. In multiagent environments, the planning problem is complicated by the fact that multiple agents may modify the shared environment concurrently so that their plans may disrupt or reinforce each other. Interference among plans is the foundation of much multi-agent planning research, including plan coordination [6] and counterplanning [15] , in which an agent strives to achieve its goal despite or possibly due to the interference from others.
However, it is often overlooked in planning that an action can have social influences on other agents. In other words, an action can cause changes not only in the physical environment but also in the mental states of other agents, either deliberately or accidentally. Like plan interferences, social influences also impact agent planning, albeit on a different level. The difference can be seen in the following cases, where agent A plans to assassinate agent B with a knife:
i. Agent C also has a plan that needs the knife.
ii. Guard agent D sees A with a knife and decides to block A's entry to B's house. Both situations can cause the plan of A to fail, but the reasons are different. In case (i), the plans of agents A and C conflict (i.e. interfere negatively) with each other. In case (ii), however, D has no plan that conflicts with A's plan at first, but generates a new conflicting goal upon perceiving a knife on A. Thus, D's blocking the entry is a social consequence of A's walking to the door. If A hopes to succeed, he should have constructed a plan that explicitly avoids being witnessed when carrying the knife.
Since each action can arouse certain reactions from other agents, it is easy to see that agents who ignore the mental effects of actions will be blind to many further social consequences, and often fail to produce a feasible plan. A closely related concept to social consequences is social actions, which Castelfranchi defines as those actions that "deal with another entity as an agent, i.e. an active, autonomous, goal-oriented entity." [3] He further divides social actions into weak and strong ones. Weak social actions are based on beliefs, but not goals, about others' minds or actions. For instance, in case (i), if A believes that C intends to take the knife, A's taking another weapon is a weak social action, for it is based on A's own belief about C's goal but is not to change it. A strong social action, however, is directed by social goals, i.e. goals to change or maintain the mental states of others. For instance, in case (ii), if A chooses to take an alternative entrance or to drug the guard out of his consciousness, A is performing a strong social action directed by the social goal that D has no goal to block A's entrance. The model of social actions therefore distinguishes between the problem of plan coordination, which requires solely weak social actions, and the problem of social planning introduced in this paper. Social planning extends conventional planning by including social consequences as a part of its action effects, and thus requires strong social actions.
In this work, we put the concepts into practice by presenting an implementation of social planning. Since social planning extends the state space to the internal states of agents, the planning agent must treat the internal mechanisms of other agents as part of the world causality. For example, an agent's perceiving a particular object causes its belief state to change, and the new belief state activates the motivational mechanism [11] to generate a new goal state, which can be translated into a new physical state of the world through actions. Essentially, the agent builds a model of other agents and simulates their mental processes in order to reason about what actions he can perform in order to bring about certain mental states of others. However, since mental states are not directly accessible, social planning will cause the well-known ramification problem ( [2] and [8] , for example), which states that actions can have indirect effects which is context-dependent and can be potentially unbounded.
The implementation of the social planning agent takes a representation-oriented approach that leverages the expressive power of the Planning Domain Description Language (PDDL) [7] [12] to describe agent perception, mental states, belief revision and desire generation in a limited but useful way. In particular, PDDL provides a derived predicates construct that can represent the deduction from physical states to mental states. The social planning agent translates its model of other agents to PDDL files, and uses one of the state-of-the-art general-purpose planners to do the actual planning. Details of domain translation are presented in Sect. 3. One of the potential applications of social planning is on the interactive drama domain, as is demonstrated in section 4, in which social planning agents are used to simulate a simplified version of Othello, a famous play by William Shakespeare.
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PLANNING
Social planning can be viewed as basically classical single-agent planning enhanced with consideration on the social consequences of actions. The product of social planning is often (but not always) a social plan, which contains (a) actions by other agents and (b) actions by self that motivate these other agents to act. Although a social plan is a multi-agent plan, social planning is done from a single-agent perspective, utilizing actions by others only as a means to achieve its own goal. This sets social planning apart from many forms of multi-agent planning that assumes the agents are designed to be a part of a cooperative system whose objective is to maximize the team utility, such as in [9] .
In effect, social planning enhances classical planning in two ways. On one hand, active social planning aims to invoke others' goals that positively contributes to the plan, making it possible to construct plans for goals that an agent cannot achieve by itself. On the other hand, passive social planning aims to prevent a goal that is detrimental to the plan from being generated, and thus helps detect plans that work in single-agent settings but no longer works when other agents are present. Note that purely passive social planning can result in nonsocial plans because its ultimate aim is to trigger no beliefs and goals at all. This fact leads to subtleties about the identification of social actions, as will be shown in Sect. 2.2. In the remainder of the section, we will use a simple motivational, goal-oriented agent to illustrate the nature of social planning.
Formulation of Social Plans
We begin by describing an agent with naïve rule-based belief revision and motivation functions. Although decidedly simple, the agent is motivated, i.e. can generate goals autonomously, and thus satisfies the basic requirement of social planning.
Definition 1 (Description of an agent)
Let P be the set of all atomic propositions. Let R be the set of first-order sentences. An agent ag1 is a 4-tuple (Bag1, Gag1, BRRag1, MRag1), where Bag1 ⊂ P is ag1's beliefs, Gag1 ⊂ P is ag1's goals, BRRag1 ⊂ R is a set of belief revision rules, and MRag1 ⊂ R is a set of motivation rules. The rules have the form x→p, where x is a first-order proposition and p ⊂ P is the derived atom. A belief revision rule derives a belief from beliefs, while a motivation rule derives a goal from beliefs.
The agent will gain perceptual input from the environment, update the belief set using BRRag1, and then update the goal set using MRag1. If any new goal is added, the agent searches for a plan for the goal. A social planning agent (denoted ag1 in this section) can thus have an internal model of another agent (denoted ag2) using the explicit representation. The social planning agent ag1 can then infer how a percept changes the internal state of ag2. However, ag1 also needs a perception model to estimate whether the effects of its action are actually perceived by ag2. Note that it is the environment, not the agents, who dictate the range of perception. We assume that for any event e ∈ P, the environment provides the truth value of the predicate perceives(ag, e). With the above models, now we can derive the mental changes as a result of an action. To calculate the mental effect, ag1 simulates an instance of ag2 by adopting ag2's beliefs, goals and mental state transition rules. Then ag1 gives the simulated ag2 some hypothetical percepts which would result from the action, and observes the mental state change. It first applies the belief revision rules to derive the belief effects.
Definition 2 (Model of another agent)
Agent ag1's model about another agent ag2 is a 4-tuple Mag2 = (Bag2, Gag2, BRRag2, MRag2), where Bag2 = {p | believes(ag2, p) ∈ Bag1} is ag1's model about ag2's beliefs, Gag2 = {p | hasGoal(ag2, p) ∈ Bag1} is ag1's model about ag2'
Definition 3 (Belief effects of an action on one agent)
Let P-Eff(action) be the set of physical effects of action. The set of belief addition by an action action on an agent ag2 is B-
The belief effects thus include an add list and a delete list. The add list contains atoms that can be derived but was not originally believed, while the delete list contains ones that was originally believed but cannot be derived after an action is conducted. After the beliefs of ag2 are updated, motivation rules are applied to derive new goal effects.
Definition 4 (Goal effects of an action on one agent) Let Bag2' be the belief set updated with B-Add(action, Mag2) and B-Del(action, Mag2).
The set of goal additions by the action action on an agent ag2
Now we turn to actions that consume rather than produce mental effects. For an agent who plans its own actions, the actions only need to satisfy the physical precondition. However, if the plan involves actions of other agents (which we will call foreign actions), the planning agent must motivate these agents to perform them. Riedl and Young [14] are among the first to propose this additional intentional requirement in planning, although their planner is not based on the perspective of an individual agent. In short, the intentional precondition of an action is that either the performer is self or the performer desires any of the physical effects of the action by other agents.
Definition 5 (Intentional precondition)
The intentional precondition of an action performed by agent ag is the disjunction of members of the set M-Precond(action, ag)
The total precondition is the thus conjunction of the physical precondition and the intentional precondition. Finally, we derive our definition of social plans as containing one or more foreign actions, whose intentional preconditions are supported by some other actions. For convenience, we adopt the convention in plan-space planning (e.g. POP) that there is a finish action whose precondition is the goal of the plan. Thus, if the goal of the plan is a social goal, finish is considered a foreign action, and the plan a social plan.
Definition 6 (Social plan)
Let Actions(plan) be the set of all actions in plan.
Relationship between Social Actions and Social Plans
When analyzing a social plan, one may be tempted to regard it as the combination of three types of actions: social, non-social and foreign actions. While an action whose effects include some intentional precondition of another action is clearly social, one that does not is not necessarily nonsocial. Here we provide two reasons why the such an action could still be social:
1. The action belongs to a subplan that causally supports a social action. Thus, the action still can be regarded as driven by a social goal, albeit indirectly. This rises the question of the degree of sociality. 2. The action is chosen because alternatives are known to cause negative social consequences. The action could be regarded as driven by a social goal to keep another agent from generating a goal, and thus social. However, if the action is considered before the bad alternatives which are therefore never considered, can it still be said to be directed by a social goal? In essence, Castelfranchi's social action is a concept based on the agent's subjective judgment about whether it is "dealing with another entity as an agent." Whether an action is social depends on the agent's way of thinking, such as its choice of planning algorithm. Thus, it is simpler to regard social planning as incorporating social consequences than as producing social actions. On the other hand, a social plan is a structural concept. A plan is social because its structure involves other agents; how it is generated is irrelevant.
Social Planning as a Case of the Ramification Problem
Social planning relies on mental effects, which are always indirect because agents have no direct access to others' minds [8] . They are also highly context-dependent; who the witnesses are and what they have in mind decide the mental effects of an action, as shown in Definition 3 and 4. These facts classify social planning as an instance of the long recognized ramification problem, which concerns the indirect consequences of an action. A variety of methods have been proposed to (partially) solve the ramification problem in planning, including deductive planning [2] and external theorem provers [8] , among others. However, completely specifying the action ramifications can be difficult. In social planning, an action can cause mental effects, which motivate another agent to perform some action, which in turn can be perceived by yet another agent, and so on, resulting in a chain of reaction. An agent with knowledge about the mental states of a society can in principle predict the future of the society by modeling the agents' actions step by step while checking whether their interaction changes their goals and thus the course of their actions. The total effect of an action is thus the difference between how the society would evolve with and without that action. Luck and d'Inverno [10] called agents capable of modeling the society sociological agents. Unfortunately, the butterfly effects 2 of an action could be broad in scope and infinite in time, making it difficult to find a sound and complete social planner. In the next section, we will introduce a method that compiles a limited representation of the social planning problem and then solve it with a sound and complete planner.
SOCIAL PLANNING THROUGH DOMAIN COMPILATION
This section presents an implementation of social planning agents based on planning domain compilation. An assumption of automated planning is that the causality of the world is encoded in a domain-description language, which allows the specification of planning operators as triggers of state change. Therefore, planning can control the social consequences in multi-agent environments if the planning domain includes agency as part of world causality. Based on this observation, we have developed a social planning agent without resorting to a special-purpose planner 3 . Instead, the agent leverages the expressive power of PDDL to represent a social planning problem as a standard planning problem, and uses a general-purpose planner to solve it. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of the agent who plans socially with domain compilation techniques. Before planning, the agent compiles its beliefs and the ontology schema into PDDL files. A compatible planner then takes the files as input, plans, and returns the result to the agent. Domain compilation is based on the formulations of mental effects and preconditions in Sect. 2. It generates a partial representation of the social planning problem with an inherent bias towards active social planning. The remainder of this section will briefly introduce PDDL and describe the details of domain compilation into PDDL.
Introduction to PDDL
McDermott et al. [12] created the first version Planning Domain Description Language (PDDL) in an attempt to provide a standard language for specifying planning problems in the International Planning Competition. PDDL has since been revised several times for the need of the competition. As a result, most mainstream planners now adopt PDDL documents as input format.
Two PDDL documents are needed for a planning problem. The domain file defines the predicates, actions and their preconditions and effects for a planning domain. The problem file contains the initial state defined using the predicates in the domain, and a goal statement.
PDDL has a rich set of features, and most planners implement only a subset of PDDL. Barros and Musse [1] compiled a comparison of supported PDDL features for several modern planners, but did not include derived predicates, a features introduced in version 2.2 [7] . Among other features, derived predicates and conditional effects are the most crucial features for social planning because they enable flexible representation of context-dependent effects. Conditional effects allow the representation of effects which holds only if a certain condition holds before the action. On the other hand, derived predicates represent facts that can be derived from other predicates, but can never be direct effects of any action. A classic example is the above predicate in the blocks world, in which above(a, b) can only be derived from facts like on(a, c)∧ on (c, b) . Derived predicates are therefore a partial solution to the ramification problem. It is easy to see that elements of mental states also possess the properties of derived predicates because no action can directly infuse a belief in an agent; actions can only produce percepts, from which beliefs are derived. Optop [13] and Marvin [5] are two of the planners that provide the best support for derived predicates. Fig. 2 lists the mapping between a motivated agent and the corresponding PDDL constructs that describe the agent. A domain compiler (DC) compiles the domain ontology and each part of the agent into PDDL. The generation of regular predicates and actions from the domain ontology is rather straightforward and thus is omitted. Specific processes required by social planning are discussed in the following.
Automated Domain Compilation
Representing beliefs and goals. Since PDDL is unable to represent nested literals like belief(Emilia, holds(Desdemona, Handkerchief)), DC must generate additional predicates like b_holds(Emilia, Desdemona, Handkerchief) for each predicate as a workaround. Similarly, DC generates p_holds for percepts and g_holds for goals.
Perception. Any change to the mental state starts from perception. Thus, agents whose plan relies on foreign actions must have some control on the perception of other agents. We make the assumptions that agents have a perception range, and that they perceive all events happening within that range. Accordingly, an action produces percepts if and only if either of the following conditions holds: (a) the action is performed within the perception range of some other agent, (b) the action causes an object to enter the perception range of some agent. The performance of an action produces two types of events: an action event represents the performance of an action, while state events represent the changed state after the performance of the action.
PDDL implementation of perception.
Percepts are represented in PDDL as conditional effects of an action because an action successfully invokes percepts only when the geographic relationship between agents is valid. 4 The following expression in terms of PDDL represents the conditional state event of performing drop(actor, thing, place): 
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The action goto is more complex because it involves location change, and its corresponding code is too long to be listed here. Basically, performing a goto will cause the actor to perceive all (observable) predicates describing everything in the new place, and cause everyone in the new place to perceive all predicates describing the actor. Therefore, domain compilation has to list all predicates as the condition effects of goto.
Belief revision and goal generation. Belief revision is the process of updating beliefs according to the percepts. There are two types of predicates for beliefs: action event belief and state belief, in correspondence with the two types of percepts. In addition to directly reflecting percepts, state beliefs can also be derived from existing ones using belief revision rules. For example, the social knowledge may describe agents as having a belief revision rule like the following one:
Note that gives(ag1, ag2, t) is an action event belief, while others are state beliefs. However, a social planning agent adopts the rule not to revise its own beliefs, but to reason about how to activate it for other agents in order to change their minds. Therefore, the subjective rule needs to be transformed into a relative one, in which each literal becomes a belief of some particular agent. The resulting axiom is as follows: ∀subject, belief(subject, loves(ag1, ag2) ← ∃t, belief(subject, precious(t)) ∧ belief(subject, gives(ag1, ag2, t)) ∧ belief(subject, man(ag1)) ∧ belief(subject, woman(ag2) ) DC uses the same procedure to compile motivation rules for describing goal generation.
PDDL implementation of belief revision and goal generation. Beliefs and desires are described as PDDL derived predicates of the form (:derived P F), meaning that predicate P holds iff formula F holds. Here is an example of the above belief of love, specifying both sources of belief: Below is a compiled motivation rule specifying that agents will generate goals to get precious things at the same place as his current location.
(:derived (g_holds ?s ?t) (and (b_precious ?s ?t) (exists (?p) (and (in ?s ?p) (in ?t ?p))) ) Action selection. An agent will attempt to achieve the goals through actions. To represent the relationship between goals and actions, DC extends action preconditions according to the formulation of intentional precondition in Definition 5, which states that an action can be included in the plan only if some of its effects are desired by the performer. Although the use of intentional preconditions facilitates active social planning, it also leads to limitations in passive social planning. The reason is as follows. A satisfied precondition merely implies that the action is feasible, not that the action is necessary. This goes contrary to the fact that when an agent desires some effect of an action, the agent will perform it, unless there is an alternative action that provides the same effect. Thus, other agents' actions whose intentional preconditions are accidentally satisfied during planning will be performed. A normal planner will simply choose not to include these actions in the plan if they are irrelevant or detrimental to the goal, but that they will still be performed is not changed.
PDDL implementation of action selection.
The PDDL is exactly modeled after Definition 5. For the drop action that has the physical effects in(thing, place)   holds(actor, thing), the intentional precondition is Macro actions. Another problem is that the other agent may need more than one action to achieve the goal. To model this, social planning agent may have to plan for other agents and check interferences among all plans. Since plan coordination is outside the scope of this paper, we use macro actions to bypass the problem. Macro actions represent a sequence of actions to achieve a goal, like plan libraries. They have the same format as regular actions, except that they can only be performed by other agents. An example in our domain is steal-for, which represents walking to the victim, stealing something, walking to the master, and give it to the master. PDDL implementation of macro preconditions. The PDDL for macro actions is not different from that for regular actions in terms of perceptual effects. The only difference is that macro actions do not have the self disjunct in their intentional preconditions.
Problem generation. Whenever a social planning agent chooses a goal to plan for, DC creates a PDDL problem file containing the goal and the agent's social and physical beliefs as the initial state. The translation process for beliefs to PDDL simply involves dumping all beliefs as PDDL literals. A physical belief has the form (holds Iago Handkerchief), while (g_holds Cassio Cassio Handkerchief) represents a social belief that Cassio desires to hold the handkerchief. With the domain and problem files, the planner can connect the actions to produce a plan.
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
The implementation is based on our ontology-based agent environment, which uses OWL models to describe the knowledge schema and action specification. Details about the system can be found in [4] . The domain compiler translates OWL models to PDDL files. Both the agents and the domain compiler are implemented in Java and use sockets to connect to McDermott's Optop planner, which runs on Lisp.
The Othello Scenario
We draw our inspiration from Shakespeare's Othello, a prime example of shrewd social planning. A vastly simplified version of it is used as the scenario for demonstration. Here is our mundane version: All the characters are modeled as autonomous motivated agents, but Iago is the only social planning agent among them. The scenario contains 9 objects, 6 actions, 1 macro action, and 16 basic predicates, each of which has 3 extended versions: belief, goal and precept. The actions are goto, pickup, drop, kill, request_in, and request_holds, the latter two being communicative actions representing a request to adopt a goal to be in somewhere or to hold something. The macro action is steal_for. One belief predicate, b_loves, is derived from a motivation rule of folk psychology basically stating that when an agent C finds a gift given to person A to be on person B of an opposite sex, C believes that A loves B. Two goal predicates, g_holds and g_dead, are derived from two motivation rules, greed and jealousy. The greed rule states that an agent will desire to take away precious things in his residing location, and the jealousy rule states that an agent will desire to kill his wife and her lover, if the lover is not the agent himself.
Results and Performance
In the simulations, both active and passive social planning plays a part in Iago's plan. In a simulation run in which Iago's goal was hasGoal(Othello, dead(Desdemona)), Iago did produce a plan, but this plan included an action to carry the handkerchief to Othello's home, resulting in the deaths of both Desdemona and Iago himself, the latter being an undesirable side effect. To correct this, the goal is conjoined with ¬has-Goal(Othello, dead(Iago)) to enforce the passive social planning to remove the side effect. On a 3.0 GHz Pentium 4 computer running CLISP, Optop takes 10.2 seconds to find a correct plan. The domain compiler needs to be ported to work with Marvin [5] , whose support on conditional effects is limited. We have not finished the porting, but our initial experience is that Marvin takes excessive time in preprocessing the domain. The output of Optop is presented in the following with adjusted indentation. However, it comes up with a plan that is slightly different from the original scenario in that Iago requests Cassio to visit Othello, not vice versa. 
CONCLUSION
When multiple motivated agents inhabit the same environment where they can see each other, effects of an action will enter the witnesses' minds and change their beliefs and goals and could thus initiate a series of reactions. Since actions may have social ramifications, an agent can no longer be oblivious of others while making plans. Instead, they should use actions to motivate others to conduct parts of the plan, and avoid actions with negative social consequences. The formulation of social plans takes into consideration of the dependence relation between actions of self and actions of others in a plan. Although a sound and complete social planner is very difficult to produce, we show that a reduced social planning problem can be represented using a standard domain description language. The implementation of social planning agents demonstrates that social planning through planning domain compilation can be done with a general purpose planner. Since social planning makes no assumption about whether agents are cooperative or competitive, improved understanding of the problem, its logical characterization and its computational properties could shed lights on how human-like agents interact socially in general.
